

AI and Predictive Policing: Reconstructing Fair Trial Principles in the Age of Algorithmic Justice

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Abstract

The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) within criminal justice systems has transformed contemporary law enforcement from reactive adjudication toward predictive governance based on algorithmic surveillance, risk assessment, and data-driven policing. While predictive policing technologies are frequently promoted as instruments of efficiency and objectivity, their increasing use has generated profound concerns regarding algorithmic bias, procedural inequality, opacity in decision-making, and the erosion of fair trial guarantees. This article examines how the rise of algorithmic justice challenges the foundational principles of modern criminal procedure, particularly the presumption of innocence, transparency, equality before the law, and the right to defense. Using normative legal research with conceptual and comparative approaches, this study analyzes the development of predictive policing and AI governance in several jurisdictions, including the United States, China, the European Union, and Indonesia. The article argues that conventional fair trial doctrines are increasingly inadequate in responding to opaque and predictive systems of algorithmic governance because existing procedural safeguards were primarily designed for human decision-makers rather than automated computational systems. This study further demonstrates that AI-driven law enforcement not only reproduces structural discrimination embedded within historical criminal data, but also expands state surveillance capacities through technologically mediated forms of governance. As a theoretical contribution, this article proposes a reconstruction of fair trial principles through a framework of human-centered algorithmic governance emphasizing algorithmic transparency, explainability rights, meaningful human oversight, anti-discrimination safeguards, independent algorithmic auditing, and digital procedural rights. Ultimately, the article argues that the future legitimacy of criminal justice systems depends upon the ability of legal institutions to control algorithmic power while preserving constitutionalism, procedural justice, and fundamental human rights in the era of digital governance.

Keywords: predictive policing; algorithmic justice; fair trial; procedural inequality; AI governance.

Abstrak

Perkembangan pesat kecerdasan buatan (artificial intelligence) dalam sistem peradilan pidana telah mentransformasi penegakan hukum modern dari model adjudikasi reaktif menuju tata kelola prediktif (predictive governance) berbasis pengawasan algoritmik, penilaian risiko, dan data-driven policing. Meskipun teknologi predictive policing sering dipromosikan sebagai instrumen efisiensi dan objektivitas, penggunaannya justru menimbulkan persoalan serius terkait bias algoritmik, ketidaksetaraan prosedural, opasitas pengambilan keputusan, dan melemahnya jaminan fair trial. Artikel ini menganalisis bagaimana perkembangan algorithmic justice menantang prinsip-prinsip

fundamental hukum acara pidana modern, khususnya asas praduga tak bersalah, transparansi, persamaan di hadapan hukum, dan hak pembelaan diri. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif dengan pendekatan konseptual dan komparatif melalui analisis perkembangan predictive policing dan tata kelola AI di beberapa yurisdiksi, termasuk Amerika Serikat, Tiongkok, Uni Eropa, dan Indonesia. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa doktrin fair trial konvensional semakin tidak memadai dalam merespons sistem tata kelola algoritmik yang bersifat prediktif dan opak karena perlindungan prosedural yang ada pada dasarnya dirancang untuk pengambil keputusan manusia, bukan sistem komputasional otomatis. Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa penegakan hukum berbasis AI tidak hanya mereproduksi diskriminasi struktural yang telah tertanam dalam data kriminal historis, tetapi juga memperluas kapasitas pengawasan negara melalui mekanisme tata kelola digital. Sebagai kontribusi teoretis, artikel ini menawarkan rekonstruksi prinsip fair trial melalui kerangka human-centered algorithmic governance yang menekankan transparansi algoritmik, hak atas penjelasan (explainability rights), pengawasan manusia yang bermakna (meaningful human oversight), perlindungan anti-diskriminasi, audit algoritmik independen, dan hak-hak prosedural digital. Pada akhirnya, artikel ini menegaskan bahwa legitimasi sistem peradilan pidana di masa depan sangat bergantung pada kemampuan institusi hukum dalam mengendalikan kekuasaan algoritmik tanpa mengorbankan konstitusionalisme, keadilan prosedural, dan hak asasi manusia di era tata kelola digital.

Kata Kunci: predictive policing; algorithmic justice; fair trial; ketidaksetaraan prosedural; tata kelola AI.



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Introduction

The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) within criminal justice systems has transformed the ways in which states identify, predict, and respond to crime through the use of predictive policing, criminal data analytics, and algorithm-based decision-making systems. These technologies no longer function merely as administrative instruments, but have evolved into integral components of modern legal decision-production mechanisms. According to Cary Coglianese and David Lehr, this transformation reflects a significant shift from conventional legal bureaucracy toward algorithmic governance, which relies on data processing and statistical prediction within regulatory and law enforcement processes (Coglianese & Lehr, 2017). In this context, AI is promoted as a solution to the institutional limitations faced by law enforcement agencies, while simultaneously serving as an instrument for enhancing the efficiency and objectivity of criminal justice systems amid the growing complexity of digital and transnational crime.

Nevertheless, the development of AI-based legal technologies also generates a fundamental paradox between procedural efficiency and substantive justice. Predictive policing systems operate through the processing of historical data to predict the likelihood of criminal activity or identify individuals considered to present high risks of offending. The problem, however, lies in the fact that the criminal data used within algorithmic systems frequently reflect social, racial, and economic biases that have long been embedded within previous law enforcement practices. Frank Pasquale,

in *The Black Box Society*, explains that algorithms are never truly neutral because they are constructed through processes of data selection and system design that inevitably represent particular institutional interests (Chander, 2017; Pasquale, 2015). Consequently, the technological objectivity claimed by AI systems may in fact conceal the reproduction of structural inequality in more technocratic and less publicly accountable forms.

These debates intensified following the controversy surrounding the use of the COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) system in the United States, which was criticized for demonstrating discriminatory tendencies toward particular racial groups in criminal risk assessments. An investigation conducted by ProPublica revealed that the COMPAS algorithm more frequently classified Black defendants as high risk compared to White defendants under relatively similar circumstances (Angwin et al., 2016). Sandra G. Mayson characterizes this phenomenon as “bias in, bias out,” referring to situations in which AI systems reproduce social biases already embedded within historical criminal justice data (Mayson, 2019). Under such conditions, algorithmic systems not only risk reinforcing discriminatory practices, but also transform the orientation of criminal justice from adjudication based on evidentiary proof toward forms of probabilistic governance grounded in predictive calculation.

This transformation demonstrates that the use of AI within legal systems cannot be separated from political power configurations and models of surveillance governance. In China, the deployment of facial recognition, mass digital surveillance, and integrated behavioral data systems illustrates how AI technologies have evolved into instruments of extensive social control. Rogier Creemers argues that China’s digital surveillance system represents a new evolution of data-driven governance that combines technology, bureaucracy, and social control within a unified mechanism of power (Creemers, 2018). By contrast, the European Union has adopted a more protective approach toward fundamental rights through the strengthening of algorithmic transparency, human oversight, and legal accountability within AI regulation (Guadamuz, 2025; Schuett, 2024). These differing approaches demonstrate that the development of algorithmic justice is profoundly shaped by legal-political structures and state–society relations within each jurisdiction.

In developing countries, the use of AI in law enforcement becomes even more complex because it is closely related to digital inequality and unequal access to justice. Indonesia, for example, has gradually adopted the digitalization of law enforcement through Electronic Traffic Law Enforcement (ETLE), police data integration, and the development of various electronic surveillance systems. Although such policies are frequently framed as part of the modernization of legal bureaucracy, their implementation also raises serious concerns regarding personal data

protection, algorithmic transparency, and the public's capacity to access legal objection mechanisms effectively. In societies characterized by uneven levels of digital literacy, the use of AI may instead create new forms of procedural inequality because access to justice increasingly depends upon individuals' abilities to understand legal technological systems (Zuboff, 2020). Accordingly, legal digitalization not only produces administrative transformation, but also constructs new configurations of social exclusion within contemporary justice systems.

These developments demonstrate that AI is not merely a neutral technological instrument, but rather a component of modern legal power structures. From the perspective of Critical Legal Studies (CLS), law is always shaped by relations of power, political interests, and particular social constructions. Roberto Mangabeira Unger argues that claims of legal neutrality frequently function to conceal structural domination operating behind modern legal institutions (Unger, 1983). Accordingly, the use of AI in law enforcement should be understood as a new form of technocratization of justice, namely the shift of decision-making authority from human deliberation toward statistical logic and algorithmic calculation. In this context, legal systems risk experiencing depersonalization because assessments of individuals become increasingly determined by predictive data and probabilistic patterns rather than solely by concrete facts proven before courts of law.

The rise of algorithmic justice also generates serious challenges to the foundational principles of fair trial within modern legal systems. The presumption of innocence, the right to defense, equality before the law, and the transparency of judicial proceedings may all be weakened when legal decisions are influenced by algorithms that remain inaccessible and incomprehensible to the public. Mireille Hildebrandt explains that AI systems frequently operate through black box algorithms, namely opaque decision-making mechanisms that are difficult to explain even by their own developers (Hildebrandt, 2020). This condition creates an explainability crisis within law because affected individuals lack adequate capacity to understand the underlying logic of algorithmic decisions used by law enforcement authorities. As a consequence, the procedural efficiency promised by AI may directly conflict with the principles of accountability and legitimacy within criminal justice systems.

Although scholarship concerning AI and law has expanded rapidly in recent years, most existing studies continue to focus primarily on issues of technological ethics, personal data protection, and general AI regulation. Research specifically examining the relationship between predictive policing, procedural inequality, and the reconstruction of fair trial principles through socio-legal and Critical Legal Studies approaches remains relatively limited, particularly within comparative contexts involving developed and developing countries. Karen Yeung, for instance,

primarily examines the dimensions of algorithmic regulation from the perspective of administrative governance (Yeung, 2018), while many other studies tend to frame AI merely as a question of regulatory compliance and digital ethics. In fact, the use of AI in criminal justice systems has fundamentally transformed the epistemological foundations of modern criminal law from systems of proof-based adjudication toward systems of prediction grounded in probabilistic calculation and risk management.

Based on these considerations, this article aims to critically analyze the relationship between AI, predictive policing, and procedural inequality within contemporary criminal justice systems through socio-legal and comparative legal approaches. This article argues that the use of AI in law enforcement does not necessarily strengthen procedural justice, but may instead reproduce structural bias, expand the power of digital bureaucracy, and create new forms of legal exclusion concealed beneath claims of technological objectivity. Through a comparative examination of practices in the United States, China, the European Union, and Indonesia, this article seeks to reconstruct fair trial principles in the era of algorithmic justice through the strengthening of algorithmic transparency, digital accountability, human oversight, and the right to challenge AI-based legal decisions.

Methodology

This study constitutes normative legal research employing conceptual, comparative, and critical legal approaches to analyze the relationship between predictive policing, algorithmic power, and fair trial principles within contemporary criminal justice systems. The conceptual approach is utilized to examine the development of ideas concerning algorithmic justice, procedural fairness, and algorithmic governance within contemporary legal discourse (Van Hoecke, 2011). Meanwhile, the critical legal approach is employed to investigate how the use of AI in law enforcement may reproduce structural bias, expand state surveillance practices, and construct new configurations of power relations within criminal justice systems.

This research also applies a comparative legal approach to examine different models of AI deployment and regulation in law enforcement systems across the United States, China, the European Union, and Indonesia. The selection of these jurisdictions is based on their differing legal-political characteristics, models of digital governance, and levels of protection afforded to procedural rights in the use of AI technologies. Through this comparative approach, the study seeks to identify patterns of regulation, forms of procedural injustice risks, and legal protection models concerning the use of algorithmic systems in law enforcement processes (Samuel, 2014).

The research materials consist of both primary and secondary legal sources. Primary legal materials include regulations, policy documents, and legal instruments relating to the use of AI and

the digitalization of justice systems, including the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act, predictive policing policies, and regulations concerning digital surveillance within law enforcement systems. Secondary legal materials comprise academic books, reputable international journal articles, research reports, and scholarly publications relevant to algorithmic justice, surveillance governance, and fair trial principles. The data were analyzed qualitatively through conceptual and comparative analytical methods in order to identify the relationship between AI deployment, procedural inequality, and the need to reconstruct fair trial principles in the era of algorithmic justice (Hildebrandt, 2020; Yeung, 2018).

Findings and Discussion

Predictive Policing and the Transformation of Criminal Justice

The development of predictive policing reflects a fundamental transformation in contemporary criminal justice systems from reactive law enforcement models toward forms of predictive governance. In conventional criminal justice systems, law enforcement processes have generally been constructed around actions that have already occurred through mechanisms of evidence, investigation, adjudication, and criminal accountability (post-crime adjudication). However, the expansion of AI in law enforcement has shifted this orientation toward risk identification, probabilistic calculation, and the prediction of criminal behavior before a criminal offense actually occurs (Coglianese & Lehr, 2017). According to Richard Berk, AI systems in law enforcement operate through the use of machine learning and historical data analysis to predict crime patterns and particular levels of social risk (Berk, 2021). In this context, law no longer functions merely as an instrument for resolving legal violations, but also as an anticipatory mechanism that relies on statistical calculation and data processing to manage potential social threats.

This transformation is clearly visible in the deployment of predictive policing systems such as PredPol in the United States, which utilizes historical crime data analysis to predict the location and timing of criminal activity. In addition, various jurisdictions have increasingly adopted risk assessment tools such as COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) to evaluate defendants' recidivism risks within criminal justice proceedings. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson explains that the rise of data-driven policing has transformed modern policing practices from conventional investigative models into data-based predictive systems (predictive analytics) (Ferguson, 2018, 2021). The use of such systems enables law enforcement agencies to intensify surveillance over particular regions or individuals based on algorithmic calculations concerning the probability of criminal activity. In practice, this approach is often justified as a

means of improving operational efficiency amid the increasing complexity of urban crime and digital criminality (Brayne, 2020).

Nevertheless, predictive policing raises serious concerns regarding the epistemological transformation of contemporary criminal justice systems. Bernard E. Harcourt characterizes this development as a shift from punishment after wrongdoing toward governing through risk, namely a condition in which individuals are increasingly evaluated based on the possibility of future criminal behavior rather than solely on concrete actions that have been legally proven (Harcourt, 1989; Horgan, 2008). Within this paradigm, legal systems move away from retrospective adjudication toward predictive governance that places statistical probability at the center of state intervention. This phenomenon demonstrates that AI is no longer merely an administrative tool, but has become part of a new governing logic within modern law enforcement practices. According to Shoshana Zuboff, the expansion of such data-driven systems forms part of the broader development of surveillance capitalism, in which human behavior becomes an object of surveillance, prediction, and institutional control (Zuboff, 2023).

These concerns become even more complex because algorithmic systems operate on historical crime data that are often shaped by social bias and structural discrimination. In the case of COMPAS in the United States, an investigation conducted by ProPublica revealed that the AI system disproportionately classified Black defendants as “high risk” compared to White defendants under relatively similar conditions (Angwin et al., 2016). Sandra G. Mayson explains that AI systems essentially reproduce discriminatory patterns already embedded within previous criminal justice data, thereby creating the phenomenon commonly described as “bias in, bias out.” (Mayson, 2019). Consequently, claims regarding the objectivity of predictive policing technologies become deeply problematic because algorithms are never entirely neutral, but are instead shaped by processes of data selection, system design, and institutional priorities. Frank Pasquale further describes modern algorithmic systems as a black box society, namely technological structures that operate opaquely and remain difficult to scrutinize publicly despite their substantial influence on social and legal life (Pasquale, 2015).

The transformation toward algorithmic policing is also closely connected to the development of surveillance governance and the expansion of digitally mediated state bureaucracy. In China, the deployment of facial recognition, real-time surveillance, and integrated behavioral data systems illustrates how AI is increasingly used as an instrument of large-scale social control. Rogier Creemers argues that the development of digital surveillance systems in China reflects a new form of data-driven governance that combines technology, bureaucracy, and political stability within a unified mechanism of social control (Creemers, 2018). Such systems enable the state to

conduct massive behavioral monitoring through the integration of AI technologies and national databases. In this context, AI is not merely associated with improving law enforcement efficiency, but also with expanding the state's capacity to manage and regulate social space through digital technologies.

By contrast, the European Union has adopted a relatively different approach by placing human rights protection and algorithmic transparency at the center of AI governance. Through the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act, the European Union has begun restricting the use of high-risk AI systems, including those employed in law enforcement and public surveillance (Schuett, 2024). The regulation emphasizes the importance of human oversight, algorithmic transparency, and the protection of citizens' procedural rights in the use of AI systems. This approach demonstrates that the development of algorithmic justice is shaped not only by technological advancement, but also by legal-political configurations and competing paradigms of human rights protection across jurisdictions.

In developing countries such as Indonesia, the use of AI-based technologies in law enforcement remains in a transitional phase through the gradual digitalization of bureaucratic administration and electronic surveillance systems. The implementation of Electronic Traffic Law Enforcement (ETLE), police data integration, and facial-recognition surveillance technologies demonstrates an increasing tendency toward the digitalization of national law enforcement systems. Nevertheless, these developments have not been fully accompanied by adequate legal frameworks concerning personal data protection, algorithmic transparency, and oversight mechanisms governing the use of AI by law enforcement authorities (Hidayah, 2025). In societies characterized by uneven levels of digital literacy, the use of AI-driven legal technologies risks generating new forms of procedural inequality because access to justice increasingly depends on individuals' capacities to understand digital systems and electronic surveillance mechanisms (Hildebrandt, 2020).

Ultimately, predictive policing should not be understood merely as a technological innovation in law enforcement, but rather as a structural transformation of the paradigm of modern criminal justice systems. The use of AI has shifted the fundamental orientation of criminal law from retrospective adjudication toward predictive governance based on risk management and probabilistic calculation. This transformation demonstrates that the rise of algorithmic justice is not solely a matter of technological efficiency, but also concerns changing relationships between the state, law, and citizens in the era of digital governance. Accordingly, the use of AI within criminal justice systems requires critical evaluation to ensure that technological modernization does

not instead intensify discrimination, excessive surveillance, and procedural injustice within contemporary legal systems.

Algorithmic Bias and Procedural Inequality

The use of AI in criminal justice systems is frequently promoted as a mechanism capable of enhancing objectivity, efficiency, and consistency in law enforcement processes. In practice, however, algorithmic systems generate serious concerns regarding the reproduction of bias and procedural inequality within contemporary legal systems. The primary issue lies in the fact that algorithms operate on historical data that are never entirely neutral, but rather shaped by long-standing patterns of social, racial, economic, and institutional discrimination embedded in previous law enforcement practices (Lebovits, 2019). Virginia Eubanks argues that data-driven technologies often reinforce social inequality because algorithmic decision-making relies on statistical generalizations that disregard individual circumstances and broader social realities (Eubanks, 2018; Tunstall, 2018). In this context, AI does not eliminate human bias; instead, it reproduces and amplifies such bias through digital mechanisms that are more systematic, scalable, and difficult to detect.

These developments demonstrate that claims of technological objectivity in predictive policing are fundamentally problematic. Algorithms are never entirely neutral because they are constructed through processes of data selection, system design, and institutional prioritization that inevitably reflect existing social and political power relations. Frank Pasquale characterizes modern algorithmic systems as black box systems because they exercise significant influence over public decision-making while remaining opaque and resistant to public scrutiny (Pasquale, 2015). Consequently, decisions generated through AI are often perceived as “scientific” or “objective” merely because they rely on statistical calculations and computational processes. Yet, as Safiya Umoja Noble emphasizes, algorithmic systems invariably carry embedded social assumptions and structural biases originating from the environments in which data are produced (Hoffman, 2019; Noble, 2018). The deployment of AI in legal systems therefore risks creating what may be termed the myth of algorithmic neutrality, whereby discrimination is concealed beneath the appearance of technological precision and computational rationality.

The reproduction of algorithmic bias is particularly evident in the use of the COMPAS system in the United States, which is employed to assess defendants’ recidivism risks within criminal justice proceedings. An investigation conducted by ProPublica revealed that the COMPAS algorithm disproportionately classified Black defendants as “high risk” compared to White defendants, despite relatively similar rates of actual reoffending (Angwin et al., 2016). Sandra G. Mayson describes this phenomenon as “bias in, bias out,” referring to situations in which AI

systems merely replicate discriminatory patterns already embedded within historical criminal justice data (Mayson, 2019). As a result, AI does not necessarily create a more equitable legal system; rather, it extends practices of racial profiling through digital mechanisms and automated decision-making processes that appear objective on the surface.

Beyond racial discrimination, the use of AI in law enforcement also risks reinforcing broader social and economic inequalities in the distribution of state surveillance. Sarah Brayne demonstrates that data-driven policing is disproportionately concentrated in areas characterized by high crime rates, which are often inhabited by economically vulnerable groups and minority communities (Brayne, 2020). This condition produces a feedback loop effect, whereby increased surveillance in certain neighborhoods generates more crime data from those same locations, leading algorithms to repeatedly direct law enforcement attention toward identical social groups. In this context, AI functions not merely as a predictive tool, but also as a mechanism for distributing state surveillance and social control unevenly across society. Accordingly, algorithmic policing may intensify structural inequalities by reinforcing patterns of over-policing and discriminatory targeting against marginalized communities.

The expansion of algorithmic policing across different jurisdictions further illustrates that procedural inequality generated by AI is deeply influenced by political-legal structures and models of digital governance. In the United States, the primary concern relates to racial bias and discriminatory policing practices targeting minority communities. In China, AI has increasingly been integrated into surveillance-oriented governance systems through the use of facial recognition, real-time monitoring, and behavioral data integration on a massive scale (Ahmed, 2019). Rogier Creemers argues that China's digital governance model represents a new form of data-driven governance combining technology, bureaucracy, and political control within an integrated mechanism of social regulation (Creemers, 2018). Under such conditions, AI functions not merely as an instrument of law enforcement efficiency, but also as a technology of state control capable of expanding surveillance capacities over public life.

By contrast, the European Union has adopted a more rights-oriented approach emphasizing transparency, accountability, and human oversight in AI governance. Through the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act, many AI applications in law enforcement have been classified as high-risk systems subject to stricter regulatory safeguards and procedural protections (Ziller, 2024). This regulatory framework demonstrates that the governance of AI is not solely a technological issue, but also a constitutional and human rights concern involving the protection of procedural fairness within digital legal systems. Nevertheless, debates within the European context continue

to reveal concerns that technological development may outpace legal safeguards, thereby creating new forms of algorithmic discrimination and digital inequality despite regulatory intervention.

In developing countries such as Indonesia, the risks of procedural inequality become even more complex due to unequal technological access, weak personal data protection, and limited regulatory capacity regarding algorithmic governance. The implementation of Electronic Traffic Law Enforcement (ETLE), police data integration, and AI-assisted surveillance technologies is frequently portrayed as part of the modernization of state bureaucracy and national law enforcement systems. However, these developments have not been accompanied by sufficiently robust mechanisms concerning algorithmic transparency, independent oversight, and accessible legal remedies for affected individuals (Hidayah, 2025). In societies characterized by uneven levels of digital literacy, the deployment of AI-based legal technologies risks generating new forms of digital procedural inequality, as individuals' abilities to understand, access, and challenge algorithmic decisions are heavily shaped by their socio-economic conditions and technological capacities.

Ultimately, the central problem surrounding AI in criminal justice systems lies not merely in technical algorithmic errors, but in the reproduction of structural inequality through systematic and opaque digital mechanisms. AI cannot be understood as a neutral technology because algorithms are inevitably shaped by data structures, institutional interests, and surrounding configurations of power. Accordingly, the expansion of predictive policing and algorithmic governance within criminal justice systems requires critical legal scrutiny to ensure that technological modernization does not instead intensify discrimination, excessive surveillance, and procedural inequality within contemporary societies.

The Crisis of Fair Trial in the Age of Algorithmic Justice

The expansion of AI within criminal justice systems has generated profound challenges to the traditional understanding of fair trial principles in modern legal systems. Conventionally, the concept of a fair trial is closely associated with procedural guarantees such as the presumption of innocence, equality before the law, transparency of judicial proceedings, the right to defense, and the ability of defendants to challenge evidence presented against them (Jackson & Summers, 2016). However, the growing reliance on algorithmic systems in policing, prosecution, sentencing, and judicial administration has gradually transformed the procedural foundations upon which criminal justice systems have historically operated. In this context, algorithmic governance introduces a new mode of decision-making in which statistical prediction, automated assessment, and computational analysis increasingly shape legal outcomes.

One of the most significant challenges concerns the erosion of the presumption of innocence within predictive policing systems. Traditional criminal law frameworks generally require that individuals be judged on the basis of proven actions supported by legally admissible evidence. Yet predictive policing systems increasingly rely on probabilistic assessments designed to identify individuals or communities considered likely to engage in criminal activity in the future (Ferguson, 2021). Bernard E. Harcourt argues that this shift reflects the emergence of actuarial justice, where risk calculation replaces individualized adjudication as the central logic of criminal governance (Harcourt, 1989; Horgan, 2008). As a consequence, individuals may become subjects of surveillance, intervention, or suspicion not because of unlawful conduct that has already occurred, but because algorithmic systems classify them as statistically “risky.” Such developments blur the boundary between prevention and punishment, thereby creating tensions with the foundational principle that criminal liability should be based on concrete acts rather than predictive assumptions.

The use of algorithmic systems in criminal justice also raises serious concerns regarding transparency and explainability. Many AI-driven systems operate through highly complex computational processes that remain inaccessible not only to the public, but often even to judges, lawyers, and defendants themselves. Frank Pasquale describes this phenomenon as the rise of the black box society, in which algorithmic infrastructures significantly influence legal and social decisions while remaining opaque and difficult to scrutinize (Pasquale, 2015). In criminal proceedings, opacity becomes particularly problematic because defendants may be unable to understand how algorithmic assessments are generated or how certain legal conclusions are reached. Consequently, procedural fairness becomes increasingly difficult to ensure when the reasoning behind legal decisions is effectively hidden within inaccessible technological systems.

The crisis of transparency further affects defendants’ ability to exercise their procedural right to challenge evidence and contest legal determinations. Under conventional fair trial standards, defendants possess the right to examine evidence, question witnesses, and challenge the legal basis of accusations brought against them. However, algorithmic systems frequently rely on proprietary software, confidential datasets, and undisclosed computational methodologies protected by corporate secrecy or institutional confidentiality (Taeihagh, 2025; Wexler, 2018). Rebecca Wexler argues that this condition creates a form of evidentiary opacity in which defendants face substantial obstacles in contesting algorithmic evidence because they lack access to the underlying systems generating legal assessments (Wexler, 2018). As a result, procedural rights that are formally guaranteed within criminal justice systems risk becoming substantively weakened when algorithmic processes cannot be meaningfully scrutinized in court.

The increasing use of AI in judicial and administrative decision-making also raises concerns regarding the displacement of human judgment within legal processes. Traditionally, judges exercise discretion through contextual interpretation, moral reasoning, and consideration of individual circumstances. Algorithmic systems, by contrast, operate through statistical models that prioritize patterns, correlations, and predictive efficiency. According to Mireille Hildebrandt, the expansion of computational governance risks transforming law from a normative system grounded in human interpretation into a system increasingly shaped by automated pattern recognition and data-driven rationality (Hildebrandt, 2020). This transformation potentially undermines the human-centered character of justice because legal decisions become increasingly dependent upon technological systems that lack moral reasoning, empathy, and contextual sensitivity.

These challenges become even more significant in jurisdictions where legal safeguards regulating AI remain underdeveloped. In many developing countries, including Indonesia, digital transformation within law enforcement has expanded more rapidly than the development of legal protections governing algorithmic accountability and procedural rights. The increasing use of electronic surveillance systems, biometric identification technologies, and integrated law enforcement databases has not been fully accompanied by transparent oversight mechanisms or accessible legal remedies for affected individuals (Hidayah, 2025). In societies characterized by unequal digital literacy and limited technological awareness, defendants may face additional procedural disadvantages when confronted with algorithmic systems they do not fully understand and cannot effectively contest.

Different jurisdictions have attempted to address these challenges through varying regulatory approaches. The European Union has adopted a comparatively rights-oriented model emphasizing human oversight, accountability, transparency, and procedural safeguards through the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (Ziller, 2024). By contrast, the United States continues to rely on fragmented judicial oversight and sectoral regulation, while China has integrated AI into broader state-centered surveillance and governance structures. These divergent approaches demonstrate that the crisis of fair trial in the age of algorithmic justice is not merely technological, but fundamentally constitutional and political in nature. The regulation of AI ultimately reflects competing visions concerning the relationship between state power, technological governance, and individual rights within contemporary legal systems.

To better illustrate these tensions, the following table maps the relationship between core fair trial principles and the procedural risks generated by algorithmic governance. The table demonstrates that the expansion of AI in criminal justice systems affects not only technical aspects of law enforcement, but also the normative foundations of procedural justice itself. In this context,

algorithmic governance increasingly challenges the capacity of conventional legal safeguards to ensure transparency, equality, and accountability within modern criminal proceedings.

Table 1. Algorithmic Justice and the Crisis of Fair Trial Principles

Fair Trial Principle	Algorithmic Challenge	Procedural Consequence
Presumption of innocence	Predictive risk assessment	Pre-emptive suspicion and profiling
Transparency	Black-box algorithms	Limited public scrutiny
Right to defense	Restricted access to algorithmic evidence	Difficulty contesting legal decisions
Equality before the law	Biased datasets and profiling	Discriminatory legal outcomes
Judicial impartiality	Dependence on automated systems	Reduced human discretion

*Source: Compiled by the author from Bernard E. Harcourt, *Against Prediction* (2007); Frank Pasquale, *The Black Box Society* (2015); Rebecca Wexler, "Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets" (2018); and Mireille Hildebrandt, *Law for Computer Scientists and Other Folk* (2020).*

The table above demonstrates that the expansion of algorithmic governance has fundamentally altered the procedural architecture of criminal justice systems. The crisis of fair trial in the age of AI does not arise solely from technical deficiencies within algorithms, but from deeper structural transformations in how legal authority, evidence, and decision-making are organized within digital governance systems. Karen Yeung argues that algorithmic regulation increasingly shifts governance away from traditional legal accountability mechanisms toward automated forms of behavioral management based on prediction and data analysis (Yeung, 2018). Under such conditions, procedural justice risks becoming subordinated to technological efficiency and predictive rationality.

Ultimately, the rise of algorithmic justice reveals that traditional fair trial principles are increasingly insufficient when confronted with opaque, predictive, and data-driven systems of governance. The procedural safeguards developed within conventional criminal justice frameworks were largely designed for human decision-makers rather than automated computational systems. Consequently, the integration of AI into criminal justice requires not only technological regulation, but also a broader reconstruction of procedural justice principles capable of addressing the realities of algorithmic governance in contemporary legal systems.

Reconstructing Fair Trial Principles in Algorithmic Governance

The rapid expansion of AI within criminal justice systems demonstrates that conventional fair trial doctrines are increasingly inadequate when confronted with algorithmic forms of

governance. Traditional procedural safeguards were primarily designed to regulate human decision-makers operating within visible judicial structures, whereas algorithmic systems function through opaque computational processes, automated predictions, and large-scale data analytics. Consequently, the integration of AI into criminal justice systems requires not merely technical regulation, but a broader reconstruction of fair trial principles capable of responding to the structural transformations produced by digital governance (Hildebrandt, 2020; Schuelke-Leech, 2017). In this context, the reconstruction of procedural justice should not be understood as an attempt to reject technological development altogether, but rather as an effort to ensure that technological innovation remains subordinate to constitutional principles, human rights protections, and democratic accountability.

One of the most urgent aspects of this reconstruction concerns the principle of algorithmic transparency. Within conventional legal systems, procedural fairness depends heavily upon the ability of parties to understand, examine, and challenge the basis of legal decisions affecting their rights and liberties. However, AI-driven systems frequently operate through proprietary software, inaccessible datasets, and complex machine-learning models that remain unintelligible to defendants, lawyers, and even judges themselves (Wexler, 2018). Frank Pasquale argues that the opacity of algorithmic systems creates asymmetrical relations of power in which individuals are subjected to decisions they cannot meaningfully contest (Pasquale, 2015). Accordingly, the principle of fair trial in the age of algorithmic governance must include the right to algorithmic explainability, namely the right of affected individuals to obtain understandable explanations regarding how algorithmic decisions are produced and applied within legal processes.

The reconstruction of procedural justice must also reaffirm the centrality of human oversight within algorithmic decision-making. Although AI systems may assist legal institutions in processing large quantities of information and identifying statistical patterns, the final authority in criminal adjudication should remain under meaningful human control. Mireille Hildebrandt emphasizes that law fundamentally depends upon contextual interpretation, normative reasoning, and moral judgment that cannot be fully replicated through computational systems (Hildebrandt, 2020). Excessive dependence on predictive technologies risks transforming criminal justice into a system governed primarily by probabilistic efficiency rather than substantive justice. Therefore, algorithmic systems should function only as assistive instruments rather than autonomous determinants of legal outcomes.

In addition, the reconstruction of fair trial principles requires stronger protections against algorithmic discrimination and digital procedural inequality. As discussed previously, AI systems often reproduce structural biases embedded within historical criminal justice data, thereby

intensifying discriminatory practices against marginalized communities. Sandra G. Mayson explains that algorithmic governance may perpetuate unequal treatment because predictive systems frequently rely on datasets shaped by existing social and institutional inequalities (Mayson, 2019; Wexler, 2018). Under such conditions, formal equality before the law becomes increasingly insufficient unless accompanied by substantive safeguards capable of identifying and mitigating discriminatory algorithmic effects. Consequently, future procedural justice frameworks must incorporate mechanisms for independent algorithmic auditing, bias assessment, and periodic review of AI systems used within criminal justice institutions.


Another essential aspect of reconstruction concerns the recognition of digital procedural rights within contemporary legal systems. In conventional criminal procedure, procedural rights generally focus on physical courtroom processes such as the right to counsel, the right to examine evidence, and the right to a public hearing. However, algorithmic governance introduces new forms of procedural vulnerability arising from unequal access to technological knowledge, digital infrastructure, and algorithmic literacy (Cohen, 2019). Individuals lacking sufficient technological understanding may experience significant disadvantages when attempting to challenge AI-generated legal decisions. Therefore, fair trial principles in the digital era must expand beyond traditional procedural guarantees by recognizing emerging rights related to digital transparency, data protection, algorithmic accountability, and meaningful access to technological justice.

The reconstruction of fair trial principles also requires a shift in the orientation of AI governance itself. Contemporary approaches to algorithmic governance often prioritize efficiency, security, and predictive capacity over democratic accountability and civil liberties. Karen Yeung argues that algorithmic regulation increasingly governs society through automated behavioral management and predictive control mechanisms (Yeung, 2018). If left unchecked, such developments risk transforming criminal justice systems into instruments of permanent surveillance and pre-emptive social control. Accordingly, the governance of AI within criminal justice should be guided by a human rights-based approach that positions technological development within the broader framework of constitutionalism, procedural justice, and democratic oversight.

The reconstruction proposed in this article therefore seeks to establish a normative framework capable of balancing technological innovation with the protection of fundamental procedural rights. Rather than treating AI merely as a tool of institutional efficiency, this framework emphasizes the necessity of maintaining meaningful human control, algorithmic accountability, and democratic supervision within digital criminal justice systems. The following figure illustrates the conceptual relationship between predictive policing, procedural risks, the crisis

of conventional fair trial doctrines, and the proposed reconstruction of human-centered algorithmic governance.

Figure 1. Reconstruction of Fair Trial Principles in Algorithmic Governance



Source: Developed by the author.

The conceptual framework above demonstrates that the crisis of fair trial in the era of algorithmic justice originates from the increasing dependence of criminal justice systems on predictive and opaque forms of governance. The reconstruction proposed in this article therefore seeks to reposition procedural justice principles within a human-centered framework of algorithmic governance. Rather than treating efficiency and prediction as the ultimate objectives of legal modernization, this framework emphasizes that technological innovation must remain subordinate to constitutional safeguards, procedural accountability, and the protection of fundamental rights.

Ultimately, reconstructing fair trial principles in the age of AI requires more than technical adjustments to existing legal frameworks. The rise of algorithmic governance represents a broader transformation in the relationship between law, technology, and state power within contemporary societies. Consequently, the future of criminal justice depends upon the ability of legal systems to develop procedural safeguards capable of controlling algorithmic power while preserving the fundamental values of justice, transparency, equality, and human dignity. Without such reconstruction, the expansion of AI within criminal justice systems risks normalizing forms of digital authoritarianism and procedural inequality that fundamentally undermine the rule of law itself.

Conclusion

The expansion of AI within criminal justice systems has fundamentally transformed the orientation of modern law enforcement from reactive adjudication toward predictive governance based on algorithmic calculation, surveillance, and risk assessment. This article has demonstrated that the rise of predictive policing and algorithmic justice cannot be understood merely as a technological development aimed at improving efficiency and institutional performance. Rather, the increasing integration of AI into criminal justice systems represents a structural transformation in the relationship between law, state power, and citizens within the broader framework of digital governance. The deployment of predictive systems such as COMPAS, data-driven policing mechanisms, facial-recognition surveillance, and algorithmic risk assessment tools illustrates how contemporary legal systems are gradually shifting from retrospective accountability toward anticipatory governance grounded in probabilistic reasoning. However, this transformation simultaneously generates serious procedural challenges, including algorithmic bias, discriminatory profiling, opacity in decision-making, unequal access to justice, and the weakening of traditional fair trial guarantees. In this context, the crisis of fair trial in the age of algorithmic justice does not arise solely from technical deficiencies within AI systems, but from deeper structural tensions between technological governance and the normative foundations of procedural justice itself.

This article further argues that conventional fair trial principles are increasingly inadequate when confronted with opaque and predictive forms of algorithmic governance. Traditional procedural safeguards were originally designed to regulate human decision-makers operating within visible institutional structures, whereas AI systems frequently function through inaccessible computational processes, proprietary software, and large-scale behavioral prediction mechanisms. Consequently, the integration of AI into criminal justice systems requires not only regulatory adaptation, but also a broader reconstruction of procedural justice principles capable of addressing the realities of digital governance. The conceptual framework proposed in this article contributes to contemporary debates on AI governance by emphasizing the importance of human-centered algorithmic governance grounded in algorithmic transparency, explainability rights, meaningful human oversight, anti-discrimination safeguards, independent algorithmic auditing, and digital procedural rights. In doing so, this article seeks to bridge an important gap between criminal procedure scholarship, AI governance discourse, and human rights-based approaches to digital regulation. The reconstruction of fair trial principles proposed here therefore represents not merely a legal adjustment to technological change, but a normative effort to preserve constitutionalism, procedural equality, and democratic accountability in increasingly automated legal systems.

Ultimately, the future legitimacy of criminal justice systems will depend upon the ability of legal institutions to control algorithmic power without sacrificing the fundamental values of justice, transparency, equality, and human dignity. The rapid expansion of predictive technologies demonstrates that technological modernization alone cannot guarantee substantive justice if algorithmic systems continue to reproduce structural inequalities and opaque forms of governance. Accordingly, future legal reforms must move beyond narrow concerns of technical efficiency toward the development of robust constitutional safeguards capable of regulating AI within democratic societies. This includes strengthening international standards on algorithmic accountability, ensuring independent oversight mechanisms, expanding procedural protections against digital discrimination, and recognizing emerging digital rights within criminal justice systems. Future research should also explore the empirical implications of AI deployment across different jurisdictions, particularly within developing countries where digital transformation often occurs in the absence of adequate legal safeguards. Without such critical reconstruction, the expansion of algorithmic governance risks normalizing forms of procedural inequality and digital authoritarianism that may ultimately undermine the rule of law itself in the twenty-first century.

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